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Abstract—The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a key build-
ing block of many social applications, including VoIP commu-
nication and instant messaging. In its original architecture, SIP
heavily relies on servers such as proxies and registrars.
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) are networks comprised
of mobile devices that communicate over wireless links, such as
tactical radio networks or vehicular networks. In such networks,
no fixed infrastructure exists and server-based solutions need
to be redesigned to work in a peer-to-peer fashion. We survey
existing proposals for the implementation of SIP over such
MANETs and analyze their security issues. We then discuss
potential solutions and their suitability in the MANET context.
I. INTRODUCTION
SIP is a protocol best known for Voice over IP (VoIP) ap-
plications. It is a key protocol in the IP Multimedia Subsystem
(IMS), used to initiate (and close) communication sessions. It
does not handle the voice (or more general media) communi-
cation itself. This makes SIP applicable to a variety of social
applications, including video calls and instant messaging.
In many scenarios, such as military or emergency response
operations, the network infrastructure could be made up of
mobile devices carried by people or vehicles, communicating
directly over wireless connections, without Internet services
such as DNS. Such networks are known as Mobile Ad hoc
Networks (MANET). Implementing SIP in the MANET con-
text requires a peer-to-peer (P2P) alternative to the standard
client-server solution, and this P2P solution must be further
adapted to the constraints of MANETs. Existing solutions to
deploy SIP over MANET are surveyed in section III.
A key functionality of SIP is to manage the registration of
users, i.e. the storage of a directory linking SIP URIs with
their present status (online or not, and if so at which network
location). The main P2P solution for this is to use a Distributed
Hash Table (DHT), as proposed in early P2PSIP literature [28]
and formalized as the RELOAD protocol of RFC 6940 [18].
DHTs can be straightforwardly deployed over MANET;
however, their use in this context raises new efficiency and
security problems. The basic efficiency problem is that point-
to-point routing in a MANET is much more expensive than
over the wired Internet, and therefore the classic multi-hop
DHT routing algorithms may end up criss-crossing the net-
work, at a very high cost.
On the security side, the main weakness of a DHT is usually
seen to be the key-based routing functionality, which is used
to locate the peer responsible for a given piece of stored
data: malicious nodes in the network can disrupt the routing
procedure and lead to data storage or retrieval requests being
sent to other malicious nodes, who may not fulfill the requests
properly. We discuss these security threats in section IV.
Solutions to this problem usually rely on redundant routing
and/or redundant storage [4], [19], [32], which is problematic
in the MANET context. For one thing, it drastically increases
the (already high) cost of these operations, and for another it
may rely on underlay properties that do not hold for MANET:
for example, a remote peer cannot necessarily be reached by
two physically disjoint paths, or this will not happen when the
underlay routing is oblivious to the security issue.
The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of
these security solutions (section V) and of the security and
performance trade-offs specific to the MANET context. We
discuss these in section VI, before drawing some conclusions
and pointing to future work opportunities.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL
As an IETF standard, SIP is defined by RFC 3261, and is
normally based on a client-server architecture, i.e. a network of
SIP User Agent devices (e.g. IP phones) and SIP servers (typ-
ically managed by larger organizations or Internet providers).
SIP devices may act as clients (User Agent Client, UAC), when
they initiate communication, and as servers (UAS) when they
receive messages (typically when another user is attempting
to reach them).
SIP servers may have any or all of three roles:
• SIP Registrar: SIP clients, identified by an ID similar
to an email address (sip:alice@company.co) register with
an Address-Of-Record (AOR) entry indicating whether
they are online and their current IP address. The registrar
manages the storage of these AOR.
• SIP Proxy: A SIP proxy forwards requests to other SIP
servers, with the goal of routing the requests closer to the
target. For example, an INVITE request must be routed
to the registrar of the callee, then to the callee UAS.
• SIP Redirect: A redirect server simply redirects requests
to other valid servers.
Fig. 1. A simple SIP call flow. The message chronology goes from top to
bottom.
The standard scenario of a SIP communication session
(Figure 1) begins when Alice wants to communicate with
Boris. Alice’s device (acting as a UAC) sends an INVITE
request to a SIP proxy, which responds to Alice’s UAC with a
‘100 TRYING’ response, and forwards the request to Boris’s
registrar. To locate this registrar in the Internet context, Alice’s
proxy would use a DNS lookup for the domain of Boris’s SIP
address.
Boris’s registrar receives the request, responds again with
‘TRYING’, then looks up Boris’s current location and for-
wards the INVITE request there. Boris’s UAS responds with
‘RINGING’ (this message is forwarded back to Alice), then
sends an ‘OK’ message if Boris accepts to initiate the session
(picks up the phone). The actual applicative session (e.g. voice
communication or messaging) then happens over a separate
protocol.
Finally, either Alice or Boris hangs up, and their user agent
sends a ‘BYE’ message which is propagated to the other user
agent (not shown).
III. P2PSIP OVER MANET: STATE OF THE ART
There are currently only a few proposed solutions that
specifically address the implementation of SIP over MANETs:
TacMAN [22], the unnamed proposal of T. Wongsaardsakul’s
2010 PhD thesis [34], two separate approaches by Banerjee
et al. [5], [6], respectively identified as “Loosely Coupled”
(LCA) and “Tightly Coupled” Approach (TCA), SIPHoc [30],
[29], MANETSip [16], AdSIP [35], and finally two unnamed
proposals, by O’Driscoll et al. [24] and Aburumman et al. [1],
respectively.
A. Registration Solutions
In the absence of conventional SIP servers to act as reg-
istrars, the main problem is how to handle (or replace) this
registration service.
As appropriately analyzed by Stuedi [29] the different
solutions to store information in a distributed system with N
nodes range from local information storage (with insertion cost
O(1)) and broadcast-based discovery (with cost O(N)), to full
replication, with insertion cost O(N) and lookup cost O(1). A
DHT with efficient key-based routing provides both insertion
and lookup at a cost of O(log(N)). However, this logarithmic
cost is that of key-based routing, and is counted in overlay
hops: calculated in MANET hops, it may not be logarithmic
at all (e.g. if the underlay uses AODV routing [25], then a
single overlay unicast requires – in the worst case – a full
broadcast in the underlay).
These registration solutions can be used to classify existing
implementations of SIP over MANET, as follows.
1) Local Storage: The “pull” solution of TacMAN [22]
and the LCA approach by Banerjee et al. [5] are proposals
where each participant in the network simply stores their own
information locally, and remote peers wanting to contact them
must broadcast a search to locate them, using the underlying
MANET routing protocol (HOLSR in TacMAN, AODV in
LCA).
2) Dominating Set: In the TCA approach by Banerjee et
al.[6] and in AdSIP [35], a subset S of the peers are chosen
to act as registrars, where this subset constitutes a dominating
set of the network graph (i.e. any node in the network has
at least one neighbour in S). In the solution proposed by
Aburumman et al. [1], the SIP registration and proxy services
are also implemented by a subset of the nodes, although not
necessarily a dominating set. A similar mechanism is used in
MANETSip [16], although how the nodes forming this subset
are chosen is unclear.
In all these cases, the nodes register only with the nearest
node(s) in S: in [6] and [1] the nodes of S are the heads of
clusters, and each node registers with its clusterhead, whereas
in AdSIP each node registers with all of its neighbours in
S via a one-hop broadcast. [1] also includes backup servers
(one per cluster) that replicate data from the cluster’s primary
SIP registrar and proxy to provide load balancing and easier
hand-off when the clusterhead leaves.
The lookup operation then requires a (limited) broadcast
within S. AdSIP claims to improve over TCA by producing
a cheaper broadcast, mainly due to S forming a connected
graph in the physical network. In MANETSip, the broadcast
in S uses an efficient multicast protocol called ODMRP [21].
3) DHT storage: The solution by Wongsaardsakul [34] and
SIPHoc [30] use unstructured DHT-like solutions without key-
based routing, O’Driscoll et al. [24] propose a hierarchical
DHT solution with a Chord backbone.
Wongsaardsakul’s solution is a cross-layer designed DHT
called SMON (Structured Mesh Overlay Network), based on
an earlier design called CrossROAD [12]. As in other DHTs,
the peers generate an ID through a hash of their IP address
(or some other method), and are responsible for storing objects
with keys numerically closest to their ID. SMON does not have
any particular structured topology (as opposed to a Chord ring
for instance), instead the peers have full knowledge of all the
other participating peers and their IDs, which are obtained
from the (slightly modified) underlying protocol OLSR [11],
which handles the MANET routing.
The underlying “distributed directory” of SIPHoc, called
MAND, is comparable to SMON, except that it supports
local storage, global storage, and hash-based storage1 (by
1We note that the details of the hash-based solution are unclear.
configuration). A similar system to MAND and SMON called
OneHopOverlay4MANET[23] was also proposed outside of
the P2PSIP literature, also implementing a cross-layered de-
signed DHT using OLSR as an underlay.
The solution proposed by O’Driscoll et al. requires all of
the nodes to participate in a hierarchical DHT. The nodes are
clustered and only the clusterheads form a Chord ring, with the
nodes within each cluster forming a structured or unstructured
network. This proposal lacks an implementation or an evalu-
ation, and it is unclear how the routing across clusters might
work: presumably there needs to be a relationship between the
IDs of each cluster.
B. DHT over MANET Solutions
It is intriguing that despite the normative focus on DHTs
found in the P2PSIP proposals, few existing solutions in the
MANET context make use of the full DHT model2: SMON
and MAND are only a DHT in the sense that they allocate
storage to the nodes using keys and node IDs in the same
address space, but the network is not structured. Routing is
done with OLSR, which does not scale very well: the nodes
must have knowledge of the entire network topology.
However, it is worth noting that outside the specific SIP
over MANET literature, a few efficient solutions have been
proposed to implement DHTs over MANETs, which would
most likely be directly usable to implement P2PSIP. We
present them briefly here.
1) MADPastry: MADPastry[37] is an integration of the
Pastry DHT [27] with the AODV MANET routing proto-
col [25]. The main idea is to create a topology-aware Pastry
overlay, adapted to a mobility scenario.
The approach in MADPastry uses Random Landmark-
ing [33], where a small number of well-known reference keys
are chosen in the identifier space, and “landmark” measure-
ments are computed by the peers responsible for these keys.
The overlay then reconfigures itself periodically to maintain a
logical topology adapted to the physical locations of the nodes.
2) Virtual Ring Routing: Virtual Ring Routing (VRR)[9] is
a proposal to use a virtual ring topology based on random node
identifiers (e.g. using hashes) directly at the MANET level, to
accomplish MANET routing in addition to supporting DHT
storage using keys in the same identifier space.
The nodes organize in a virtual ring similar to Chord,
without the finger tables to distant nodes. Each node only
maintains connections to r neighbours of the virtual ring, plus
connections to its physical neighbours. For example with r = 4
the node maintains multi-path routes to its two immediate
predecessors and two followers in the virtual ring.
In addition, paths between virtual neighbours are also
recorded at every physical hop to facilitate routing.
3) Cell Hash Routing: Cell Hash Routing (CHR) [3] is
a proposal where the geographical space where the MANET
exists is partitioned into equal-sized cells. The DHT algorithm
assigns keys to cells (rather than to individual nodes) and
2The only true DHT-based solution appears to be that of O’Driscoll et al.,
although its specification is insufficient for us to comment on the details.
nodes inside the cell manage these keys. If a cell is empty
then the nearest non-empty cell takes over.
Routing is done using an adapted version of GPSR[20], a
geographic routing algorithm.
IV. THREAT MODEL
The key security properties for general P2P networks are re-
silience and integrity. Resilience deals with service availability,
while integrity covers the content delivered by the network.
In some P2P contexts, it might be important to provide other
security properties, such as anonymity and confidentiality:
anonymity aims to prevent malicious nodes from learning
about the origin of requests (e.g., Tarzan [15], MorphMix [26],
and Octopus [32]), whereas confidentiality means malicious
nodes should not learn about the content that is being queried
from the DHT (e.g., [14]).
As we will see later, some of these properties are necessary
to enable certain defenses against other attacks.
In the context of the P2PSIP application, our main focus is
on the Sybil attack and on attacks on the Storage and Retrieval
functionality of the DHT. These include both denial of service
(DoS) attacks and attacks on the integrity of stored data.
It is worth noting that DoS attacks may also happen at
different network levels, and we focus here on the risks at
the DHT level.
A. Sybil Attack
The Sybil attack [13] comes from the inherent openness of
P2P systems and consists of one malicious peer being able
to act as multiple different logical nodes in the system (i.e.,
controlling multiple IDs in the DHT). By itself, this kind of
attack does not compromise the resilience nor the integrity
of the network. However, the ability for a malicious entity
to easily control a large number of nodes greatly enhance its
ability to perform attacks. For instance, if an entity can setup
several malicious nodes in a network, his chances of disrupting
the network through a DoS attack are vastly superior than if
he controls a single one.
An extreme case of the Sybil attack is the Eclipse attack [17]
where a malicious entity controls all the nodes “surrounding”
his target. Hence, every query from the target peer passes
through a malicious node which can then manipulate the data
as he sees fit since the target has a compromised view of the
logical network.
B. Storage & Retrieval Attacks
Storage & retrieval attacks affect the primary objective of
P2P systems which is to store information and provide access
to that information. Several different attacks can fall into this
category.
1) Routing-Based Attacks: The simplest routing attack con-
sists of dropping requests seeking the next hop to reach the
node (denoted as P(k)) responsible for storing the information
a querier is interested in. This attack can take place whenever
a malicious node happens to be on the request path and poses
resilience issues.
A more sophisticated version of such a routing attack is
to provide a wrong answer to the querier sending him on a
false trail. Two objectives can be sought through this attack:
prevent the querier from getting an answer by looping through
a set of malicious nodes (which achieve the same DoS goal
as dropping the query) or fooling the querier by providing a
false (and malicious) P(k). This then sets up the table for a
Query-Based attack (see below).
2) Query-Based Attacks: The easiest query attack is for a
malicious node to refuse to serve the data by not answering
the query; a DoS attack.
A more interesting scenario is for a malicious node to
answer a query with bogus data. If the querier is unable
to detect the attack, the data integrity will be compromised
leading to potentially serious problems. If the querier detects
the attack, a DoS is likely to occur unless strong mechanisms
are implemented to recover from such a situation.
3) Resource Exhaustion Attack: RELOAD [18] mentions a
type of resource exhaustion attack where a node is asked to
store an abnormally large amount of data by malicious nodes.
As a consequence, the attacked node might be unable to store
legitimate data for which it should be responsible.
4) Injection Attack: In a P2P SIP application where the
DHT acts as a naming service (mapping each SIP ID to an
Address-Of-Record), injection attacks become a real threat.
In this attack, an attacker inserts/overwrites data in the DHT
instead of focusing on attacking the query mechanism.
5) Replay Attack: If the address (location identifier) of a
peer may change over time, then a replay attack becomes
possible: an attacker currently located at address A could reuse
an old DHT entry saying SIP ID of user U is located at A (U
was located at A in the past) to fool a querier into thinking U
is at A while a malicious node is there.
This may happen if IP addresses are dynamically allocated,
or if a peer’s location is defined by a changing DHT identifier,
as in MADPastry, DART or CHR.
V. EXISTING SECURITY SOLUTIONS
For each main type of attack, we present existing defenses in
general terms, and discuss their applicability for the different
DHT solutions listed in section III.
We first address Sybil attack resistance, then storage and
retrieval attacks. For the latter, we distinguish the problem
of securing the key-based routing (KBR) process from the
complementary problem of ensuring the integrity of the data
being returned by a queried peer.
A. Sybil Attack Resistance
As the Sybil attack consists in an attacker controlling several
distinct (virtual) identities, the main defenses for this attack
are (i) increasing the cost of new identities, or (ii) detecting
multiple virtual identities linked to the same physical entity, or
(iii) designing a protocol to limit the impact of Sybil identities.
1) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): The main solution to
the Sybil attack is to have a trusted, centralized certificate
authority (CA) to certify that a given public key is associated
with a given real-world entity. This assumes that an attacker
cannot control multiple such real-world identities, and relies
on a centralized authority that allows new nodes to join the
network. The central authority must be able to validate the
real-world identity of each node.
The applicability of this method mainly depends on the
context in which the P2P system will be used. For a private
system, e.g. a military battlefield network, the use of a PKI
will make sense. But for open systems this will be a problem.
One difficulty is to decide which identities to bind the keys
to. In [10], Castro et al. propose to assign certificates based
on nodes’ IP addresses, to compensate for the lack of other
identities. This approach requires that nodes have fixed IPs.
They also propose a revocation mechanism to activate when
nodes are misbehaving, but this requires the presence of an
online CA.
In addition, some MANET-specific DHT protocols (e.g.
CHR, MADPastry) use location-dependent identifiers. In such
a protocol, nodes must change identifier as they move, and the
CA would have to re-certify each new identifier, which even
with an online CA seems highly impractical.
Persea [2] takes a different approach to the PKI by decen-
tralizing it. When a node joins a Persea DHT, an existing
node delegates part of the ID space it is responsible for to the
new node and certifies the ID it assigns to the joining node.
The certificate is then stored in the DHT itself. This prevents
an attacker that has successfully joined the DHT from gaining
more power by inviting Sybil peers as it can only delegate part
of its own ID space. For this to be effective, it must be hard
for an attacker to join through an honest node, which could
be achieved using another Sybil attack protection mechanism.
2) Crypto-Puzzles: Another way of mitigating a Sybil
attack is to raise the cost of identities. In S/Kademlia[7],
identities are defined by key pairs where the public key begins
with one or more zeros (more zeros makes the crypto-puzzle
more difficult to solve). This means generating an identity is
costly because the nodes must generate many key pairs before
finding one that matches the zeros requirement.
For a MANET, the computation cost of generating identities
should not be too high since nodes (embedded resources) are
likely to have limited computing power, and one weakness of
this solution is that malicious actors could use offline resources
3 to massively solve crypto-puzzles.
3) Physical Triangulation: In a MANET, Sybil nodes will
correspond to the same physical device, and it has been
proposed [8] that Sybils could be detected by identifying
nodes located in the same place by triangulating their location
with respect to several “landmark” nodes. Although with high
mobility this approach will be challenging, the general idea is
useful: with location-dependent identifiers, Sybils will either
all be clustered together in the same part of the identifier space
3Resources outside the P2P network, e.g., cloud.
(a fact which can be used to design Sybil-resistant protocols),
or are more likely to be detected (as a physically close node
may detect the fact that their identifier does not match their
location).
B. Securing Key-Based Routing
Securing KBR aims to ensure that an honest peer can obtain
the address of the peer responsible for key k, which we note
P (k).
The first approach to this problem is to secure the interme-
diate steps of the KBR protocol (i.e. ensure that peers comply
with the routing algorithm, or detect peers who do not), and the
second is to make P (k) verifiable, i.e. once the KBR returns
an address, the querying peer can verify that the addressed
peer is indeed responsible for k according to the algorithm.
1) Octopus: Octopus [32] aims to detect when peers at-
tempt to manipulate their routing tables and redirect queries
to malicious attackers. This is achieved by sending anonymous
lookup requests to these predecessor nodes, and checking
their result. Octopus uses Onion routing to create anonymous
queries to intermediate nodes, and relies on public key cer-
tificates. The certificates of peers found to be malicious are
revoked by the CA, who must also investigate each case to
avoid legitimate nodes being slandered by malicious nodes.
One problem with this approach is that it requires the
routing protocol to be verifiable without local information. For
standard KBR, this is possible, but MANET-specific protocols
such as VRR or MADPastry allow peers to redirect requests
when they know of shorter physical routes than the KBR route.
Such protocols would be incompatible with Octopus.
2) Redundant Paths: HALO and Cyclone: HALO [19] and
Cyclone[4] are two proposals to support redundant KBR,
i.e. routing messages through multiple paths. As a result, a
malicious node attempting to disrupt the KBR would need
to control many different nodes to break all the redundant
routing paths, and the querying node has a higher probability
of reaching P (k). If different paths return different answers,
it should be apparent which node is actually responsible for k
(the one with the ID closest to k).
The approach of Cyclone is to construct separate overlay
networks (e.g. several Chord rings) involving the same nodes
but with different topologies. This means that independent
paths will exist in the different networks.
In HALO, which was designed for Chord, there is a single
Chord ring and the peers send lookup requests for the same
key but to different peers. The key idea is to compute the
likely locations in the address space of nodes that have P (k)
in their finger table, then ask each of those nodes to perform
locate(k).
3) Quorums: An alternative approach to independent paths
(but still essentially redundancy) is the use of quorums along
the routing path [36]: a quorum is a group of peers responsible
for the same step of a distributed algorithm (e.g. a step along a
DHT route), and provided that a majority (2/3 or 3/4 depending
on the algorithm) of the quorum members are legitimate, the
quorum members can vote (or use a Byzantine agreement
protocol) to figure out the correct outcome of their shared
processing step.
Redundant paths give a node a higher probability of reach-
ing P (k) without going through a malicious node, unless P (k)
itself is malicious. However, the routing mechanisms in DHT
make it difficult to obtain disjoint paths from one node to
another. Instead, multiple paths are likely to converge and
pass through the same nodes close to P (k), which makes
it possible for one node to corrupt many paths. Different
solutions have been proposed to allow nodes to obtain disjoint
paths, including HALO and Cyclone (see above).
4) Myrmic: Myrmic [31] is a cryptographic solution to
make sure that the responding node is indeed responsible
for the key. The idea is that a neighbourhood authority (NA)
signs certificates stating that peer P is responsible for a given
range of the ID space. The main difficulty is to handle churn,
since when peers join or leave the DHT, data that they are
responsible for changes. The NA revokes past certificates
by issuing new ones and distributes them to each node’s
neighbours. In order to check that some node P is actually
responsible for key k, P must show a certificate saying so,
and P ’s neighbours must not have any more recent certificate
(stating a different range). The querying node must therefore
be able to contact P ’s neighbours. Presumably, the list of
neighbours to be contacted (“witnesses”) would be specified
in the certificate itself.
The NA acts as local CA to circumvent the requirement of
an always online central authority. However, if NA are peers in
the network, they must not be malicious otherwise they could
issue false certificates.
C. Data Integrity
The above solutions to secure KBR aim to ensure that
locate(k) requests reach their correct target. However, if the
peer P (k) itself is malicious, then those techniques do not
help. Additional approaches have been proposed to ensure the
integrity of stored data, in order to address this problem.
1) Redundant Storage: Redundant storage implies that the
information is stored at (and retrieved from) multiple nodes.
In the presence of inconsistencies during retrieval, the querier
will know an attack attempt is probably underway. However,
if as little as one answer from the retrieval process differs
from the others, the querier has no idea which is the real
value. Whenever an attacker can manage to manipulate all
the answers (only one in the absence of duplication) for the
retrieval process to the same erroneous value, the querier has
no way of knowing an attack is underway.
2) Anonymous Data Verification: Following the idea of
Octopus (above) regarding routing, peers can also ensure that
the peers storing their data (e.g. their OAR entry) are honest
by periodically requesting their own data, which they can then
check against the data that they stored. Of course, this relies
on anonymity, which ensures that a malicious node cannot
distinguish “test” queries from “real” queries.
3) Verifiable Data: By focusing on the P2P SIP application,
it becomes easier to make data cryptographically verifiable: if
peers store the AOR for their own SIP ID, they can sign their
entries using their private key, and another peer wishing to
lookup up this peer’s address can verify the signature using
the public key associated with this peer ID. This prevents
malicious peers from creating fake entries for other SIP IDs.
However, if the peer identifiers may change, replay attacks
become possible. In this case, a signed DHT entry should be
valid only for a specific time window. This will force peers
to refresh their DHT entry, but will limit the opportunity for
replay attacks.
This idea is used in RELOAD [18], where a PKI must be in
place, although without an always-online central CA. The CA
is necessary for pre-configuration of nodes before them joining
the network but does not participate in the actual network
operations.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As a result of our previous analysis, we have identified two
main trade-offs between performance and security.
The first trade-off is related to Key-Based Routing, and the
second is related to optimizations of KBR in the MANET
context.
A. Redundancy and performance with Key-Based Routing
Key-based routing is an essential feature of DHT, that pro-
vides scalability and efficiency, since peers can route messages
in a large network while only keeping track of a small subset
of the other peers. However, KBR also creates a major security
vulnerability, for which most defenses rely on redundancy (in
storage or routing). Redundant routing increases the cost of
routing (it is multiplied by a constant factor), and depending
on network parameters it is possible that the additional cost
offsets the efficiency gains of KBR.
Most existing cross-layer designs for SIP in MANET con-
texts use key-based storage and MANET routing, and are
therefore not vulnerable to attacks on KBR. Although the
lower-level routing may still be vulnerable, this leaves one
level of vulnerability rather than two. On the other hand,
this requires the peers to have full knowledge of the DHT
membership, and greatly reduces scalability.
B. KBR in mobile contexts
KBR is known to be much less efficient when deployed
naively over a MANET, and a number of MANET-specific
designs have been proposed to mitigate this problem. However,
these performance optimizations also incur a cost in terms
of security, for two reasons: changing identifiers and ad-hoc
routing.
a) Changing identifiers: In several DHT-based MANET
routing protocols (e.g. MADPastry, CHR and DART), the
peers’ identifiers are location-dependent, and must therefore
be changed when peers move far enough. This improves the
performance of KBR in the MANET, but creates an important
security vulnerability. The fact that even legitimate peers may
adopt new identifiers makes it more difficult to detect and
defend against Sybil attacks, and creates a risk of replay
attacks.
b) Local routing decisions: In MANET-specific DHT
routing protocols, including those mentioned above and VRR,
routing is not strictly key-based: peers can make local routing
decisions based on their knowledge of their physical neigh-
bourhood. Therefore, routing decisions cannot be verified by
another peer, as in the idea of Octopus. Quorum solutions
may mitigate this problem, but in protocols with changing
identifiers attackers could easily create local groups of Sybils
that would act as a quorum.
C. Conclusion
In this paper we surveyed various techniques in the literature
for the deployment of SIP, a useful protocol to support social
applications, in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Our security analysis of these solutions shows two important
trade-offs between scalability and security, due to key-based
routing and to the optimizations of key-based routing in a
MANET context.
In addition, the MANET context also reduces the applicabil-
ity of cryptography-based solutions (certifications), including
those provisioned in the RELOAD protocol, as devices could
fall into malicious hands and start to misbehave.
On the bright side, the P2PSIP application has some in-
teresting properties such as verifiable data, which reduces
security risks related to data integrity.
In future work, we intend to explore more specifically the
attacks on P2PSIP and solutions using cross-layer designed
DHT, i.e. secure extensions to DHT-based MANET rout-
ing, or “natively” redundant MANET routing protocols (e.g.
ODMRP).
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